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Cryptomarkets—online markets for illegal goods—have revolutionized the illegal drug trade, constituting about 10% of all drug trades and attracting users to a greater variety and more addictive substances than available in offline drug markets. This review introduces the burgeoning area of sociology research on illegal cryptomarkets, particularly in the realm of drug trade. We emphasize the expanding role of illicit online trade and its relevance for understanding broader exchange challenges encountered in all illegal trade settings. Examining the effects of online illegal trade on consumption and supply-side policing, we also discuss the harm and potential benefits of moving drug exchange from offline to online markets. We argue for a network perspective's efficacy in this research domain, emphasizing its relevance in assessing trade and discussion networks, technical innovation, and market evolution and vulnerabilities. Concluding, we outline future research areas, including market culture, failure, and the impact of online illegal trade on stratification. 

Abstract Although economic sociology emphasizes the role of social networks for shaping economic action, little research has examined how network governance structures affect prices in the unregulated and high-risk social context of online criminal trade. We consider how overembeddedness—a state of excessive interconnectedness among market actors—arises from endogenous trade relations to shape prices in illegal online markets with aggregate consequences for short-term gross illegal revenue. Drawing on transaction-level data on 16 847 illegal drug transactions over 14 months of trade in a ‘darknet’ drug market, we assess how repeated exchanges and closure in buyer–vendor trade networks nonlinearly influence prices and short-term gross revenue from illegal drug trade. Using a series of panel models, we find that increases in closure and repeated exchange raise prices until a threshold is reached upon which prices and gross monthly revenue begin to decline as networks become overembedded. Findings provide insight into the network determinants of prices and gross monthly revenue in illegal online drug trade and illustrate how network structure shapes prices in criminal markets, even in anonymous trade environments. 

Physical, technological, and social networks are often at risk of intentional attack. Despite the wide-spanning importance of network vulnerability, very little is known about how criminal networks respond to attacks or whether intentional attacks affect criminal activity in the long-run. To assess criminal network responsiveness, we designed an empirically-grounded agent-based simulation using population-level network data on 16,847 illicit drug exchanges between 7,295 users of an active darknet drug market and statistical methods for simulation analysis. We consider three attack strategies: targeted attacks that delete structurally integral vertices, weak link attacks that delete large numbers of weakly connected vertices, and signal attacks that saturate the network with noisy signals. Results reveal that, while targeted attacks are effective when conducted at a large-scale, weak link and signal attacks deter more potential drug transactions and buyers when only a small portion of the network is attacked. We also find that intentional attacks affect network behavior. When networks are attacked, actors grow more cautious about forging ties, connecting less frequently and only to trustworthy alters. Operating in tandem, these two processes undermine long-term network robustness and increase network vulnerability to future attacks. 

Abstract Criminal networks are frequently at risk of disruption through arrest and interorganizational violence. Difficulties in designing empirical studies of criminal network recovery, however, have problematized research into network responses to disruption. In this study, we evaluate criminal network resilience by examining network recovery from disruption in an array of different criminal networks and across different disruption strategies. We use an agent‐based model to evaluate how criminal networks recover from disruption. Our results reveal the vulnerabilities and time to recovery of numerous criminal organizations, and through them, we identify which disruption strategies are most effective at damaging various criminal networks.